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Bank capital for market
risk: A study in incentive-
compatible regulation
Traditionally, government regulation
in the United States follows a straight-
forward command approach.  The
government states the desired activities
of the regulated firm, the allowable
actions, and the prohibited actions.
The firm is punished if it violates these
strictures.  Regulatory economists have
identified many problems with this
approach.  First, there is the problem
of asymmetry in information:  Regulations
cannot be enforced if they require
information from the firm that the
regulator cannot elicit reliably and at
reasonable cost.
Second, there is the problem of asym-
metry in expertise:  Regulated firms have
far more expertise in their industry
than regulators.  The firm’s manage-
ment may know how to achieve regula-
tors’ goals at a lower cost than would
be permitted by the regulations.  Un-
fortunately, the command approach
rarely gives management the flexibility
to carry out these cheaper approaches.
A third problem is that of implementa-
tion:  Complex regulations are diffi-
cult to implement.  As a practical
matter, command regulations must
be simpler than the activity they reg-
ulate.  The result is “one-size-fits-all”
rules, which are either overly restric-
tive and heavy-handed or not strong
enough to achieve public policy
goals.  Finally, the command ap-
proach is often subject to the law of
unintended consequences:  The com-
mand regulations may induce unin-
tended perverse behavior by the
regulated firm.
In response to the flaws in command
regulation, a new approach to regula-
tion has evolved.  “Incentive-compati-
ble” regulation seeks to align the
incentives of regulated firms with
regulatory goals.  Appropriately
designed regulatory structures cause
the firm to internalize regulatory
objectives.  With their superior access
to information and expertise, firms
can further the public interest more
effectively and more cheaply than
under the command approach.
Incentive-compatible regulation is
generally preferred by regulated
firms, since it cedes them a degree
of autonomy not permitted in the
command approach.  The firm can
choose the least burdensome way of
meeting the regulator’s goals.  Com-
petition insures that firms achieve
social goals at minimum cost.
As an example of incentive-compati-
ble regulation, this Fed Letter de-
scribes the evolution in approaches
for determining a bank’s regulatory
capital for market risk.  By “market
risk,” we mean the risk of losses to
the bank from price movements in
financial markets.  Over the past 15
years, trading in financial markets
has become a significant activity for
large commercial banks (those with
total assets in excess of $100 billion).
In 1979, only 1.3% of these banks’
assets were actively traded financial
instruments.  By 1994, this had
grown to 13.2%.1  Bank capital, and,
ultimately, the Bank Insurance
Fund, is at risk if the value of this
trading book falls rapidly due to a
precipitous change in financial mar-
ket prices.  Bank observers have
suggested that the risk to banks may
be exacerbated by the increased use
of derivatives.2  While derivative
securities can be a risk-reducing
tool, they also offer an inexpensive
way to construct a highly leveraged
asset position, which is particularly
vulnerable to rapid movements in
financial markets.  For example, the
collapse of Barings Bank last year was
precipitated by a high-stakes bet on
the direction of Japanese stock prices,
using financial derivatives traded on
exchanges in Singapore and Osaka.
Proposed capital standards for
market risk
A number of approaches have been
proposed for setting regulatory capi-
tal levels against market risk.  One of
the first was proposed in April 1993
by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision.  Known as the standard-
ized approach, this proposal followed
the conventional philosophy of com-
mand regulation.  It divides trading
book assets into different risk classes,
and assesses a fixed capital charge
against each class.
The standardized approach suffers
from asymmetry both in information
and in risk-assessment expertise be-
tween banks and regulators.  Capital
is based on the bank’s current asset
position, and thus fails to account for
dynamic trading strategies that can be
adopted by the bank for risk control.
For example, a bank may have contin-
gency plans, based on proprietary risk-
management models, to move in and
out of certain markets as risk levels
change.  This ability is not reflected in
the regulatory process.  Furthermore,
the risk-assessment models used by
large commercial banks are far superi-
or to the crude risk classes of the stan-
dardized approach.  The standardized
approach cannot take advantage of
the banks’ detailed knowledge of asset
and financial markets.  Even if regu-
lators possessed this expertise, the
cost of administering capital require-
ments at this level of detail would be
prohibitive.  This necessitates an over-
ly simple (critics would say “crude”)
set of regulations.  Finally, the stan-
dardized approach provides perverse
incentives, potentially leading tounintended consequences.  For
example, because all equity hold-
ings are assessed the same capital
charge, banks may be inclined to
increase their holdings in riskier
stocks.  This outcome would go
directly against regulatory goals and
would probably be suboptimal for
the banks themselves.
In response to this criticism, the
Basel Committee issued a revised
proposal known as the “internal-
models” approach in April 1995.
A version of this proposal was subse-
quently approved by the governors of
the central banks of the G-10 coun-
tries.3  In an important development
in the history of regulatory practice,
the approach allows banks to use
their own internal risk-assessment
models to determine the risk of their
financial asset portfolio.  Each bank
would compute the maximum loss it
might sustain over the next ten days
with 99% confidence (the so-called
value at risk), and regulators would
base their capital charge as a multi-
ple of this number.  (The multiple
would be at least three.  The regula-
tors would have the discretion to
choose a higher multiplier if a com-
parison between the estimates of the
internal models and actual perfor-
mance suggested deficiencies in the
internal models.4)
The internal-models approach
addresses the problem of expertise
asymmetry, since it uses the bank’s
more sophisticated risk-assessment
technology to determine the bank’s
market risk.  However, it also imposes
restrictive quantitative standards on
the models being used by banks.
Therefore, it still has many of the
problems associated with command
regulation.  It may induce banks to
tailor their models toward the regula-
tory process rather than toward great-
er accuracy, which would also stifle
technical innovation in risk-manage-
ment models.  An unintended conse-
quence could be that banks develop
two sets of models.  One, to be used
internally for risk assessment, would
not follow the conditions imposed by
the regulator, but would incorporate
the latest technical developments in
the field.  The other, to be used solely
for determining regulatory capital,
would follow the regulator’s condi-
tions, but would be constructed to
minimize regulatory capital.  This
would undo much of the expected
gain from basing capital require-
ments on the banks’ more accurate
risk-assessment models.
Furthermore, there is the problem
of asymmetry of information between
the banks and the regulators:  There
is essentially no way for the regulator
to verify that the value-at-risk number
given to the regulator corresponds to
the risk assessment used by the
bank’s management.  Finally, the
internal-models approach focuses on
static risk measurement.  It ignores
the possibility of dynamic risk man-
agement and the complex linkages
between risk assessment and risk
management.
An incentive-compatible approach
Due to the weaknesses of the standard-
ized approach and the internal-models
approach, many economists suggest
scrapping the command approach
entirely in favor of incentive-compati-
ble regulation.  In particular, Paul
Kupiec, James O’Brien, and other
staff members at the Federal Reserve
Board have proposed a “precommit-
ment approach” to bank capital regu-
lation.5  This approach is very simple.
Each bank states the maximum loss
that its trading book will sustain over
the next period.  The capital charge
for market risk equals this precom-
mitted maximum loss.  If the bank’s
losses exceed the precommitted level,
a penalty is imposed.
Under the precommitment approach,
the bank is free to choose both the
amount of market risk and the amount
of capital to hold against this risk.
The penalty can be structured so that
banks voluntarily choose a risk level
for their portfolios and a level of regu-
latory capital that meets the regula-
tor’s objectives, without any direct
regulatory interference.  The regula-
tor’s only role in this approach is to
verify that the bank maintains an ade-
quate risk-management structure and
to review the bank’s profit-and-loss
information.
Why might the precommitment
approach work better than the com-
mand approaches?  First, it econo-
mizes on costly capital.  Banks can
choose whether to control risk via
higher capital set-asides, more so-
phisticated dynamic hedging strate-
gies, or a reduction in portfolio
risk. It is in their own interest to
choose the least expensive method
of risk control.
A second benefit of precommitment
is that it encourages the development
of improved risk-management tech-
nologies.  Banks have a clear incen-
tive to use the most sophisticated
methods for assessing portfolio risk.
If their risk assessment is too conser-
vative, they set aside too much capi-
tal; if the assessment is insufficiently
conservative, they will violate the
precommitted loss levels too often
and bear higher-than-expected pen-
alties.  Either way, inaccurate risk
assessment is costly, so banks will
invest in procedures that increase
the accuracy of their models.
The precommitment approach
also has advantages for the banking
industry.  Precommitment is less
burdensome and intrusive than the
command approaches.6  Banks can
run their affairs as they like, provid-
ed their capital levels (in their own
assessment) are commensurate with
their risk levels.  The regulator steps
in only if the capital level, ex post,
proves insufficient.  Unlike the inter-
nal-models approach, the precom-
mitment approach does not mandate
a fixed “multiplier” on a bank’s value
at risk but allows the bank to commit
a level of capital that optimally trades
off the cost of capital against the
probability of a regulatory penalty.
Moreover, the process does not im-
pose quantitative restrictions on
banks’ risk-assessment models.  The
bank has almost unlimited flexibility
in developing its risk-assessment and
risk-management approaches.  Of
course, it must then accept the con-
sequences, including the possibility
of regulatory penalties.
Finally, the precommitment approach
also offers banks the advantage of a
low reporting burden.  The only databanks would have to report to regula-
tors would be periodic profit-and-loss
statements on their trading books.
These data are already computed
regularly by banks for risk-manage-
ment purposes.
Issues to be addressed
The details of the precommitment
approach are still being formulated.
While generally supportive, banks
have expressed several concerns
about the way that precommitment is
to be carried out.  A critical issue is
the design of the penalty.  The sim-
plest form would be a monetary fine.
A potential problem with assessing
a fine is that it “hits the bank when it
is down”:  The fine would be levied
when the bank had recently sustained
significant losses.  While this is a com-
mon argument, many contracts have
similar provisions.  For example, debt
contracts often specify an increase in
the loan rate if the firm’s condition
deteriorates.  Alternatives to a mone-
tary fine could include higher future
capital requirements, restrictions on
future trading, and public disclosure
of the violation.  Of course, these
penalty structures are not mutually
exclusive.
Another concern banks have expressed
is that precommitment could have
perverse incentives if implemented
for poorly capitalized banks.  If a
poorly capitalized bank’s trading
losses are approaching the critical
level, it may be near bankruptcy.
Such a bank will not be deterred by
the threat of a penalty, since, literal-
ly, there will be no bank left to penal-
ize.  In such a case, the bank might
be tempted to put its remaining as-
sets in highly speculative investments,
in the hope that a favorable roll of
the dice will bail it out.  The precom-
mitment approach, as currently pro-
posed, avoids this problem by limit-
ing participation to well-capitalized
banks. This would be consistent with
the limitations imposed on under-
capitalized institutions under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act.
Finally, banks have expressed con-
cern that, as currently proposed,
precommitment would not be im-
posed on nonbank financial institu-
tions.  This would seem to “unlevel”
the industry’s playing field.  It should
be noted that banks have access to
deposit insurance and other safety
net facilities, so it is appropriate to
hold them to a different standard
than other (nonbanking) financial
institutions.  However, to the extent
that nonbanks enjoy implicit govern-
ment guarantees (the notion of “too
big to fail”), perhaps capital regula-
tion should be extended to these
institutions as well.
Conclusion
The precommitment approach is a
way of inducing banks to choose a
level of capital and a risk-manage-
ment strategy that achieve regulators’
social goals, without imposing heavy-
handed regulations directly on bank
activities.  In particular, it incorpo-
rates the advantages of the internal-
models approach without the intru-
siveness and informational problems
associated with that approach.  It
attempts to improve on the advantages
of internal models by better aligning
capital requirements with the trad-
ing account’s actual risk exposure
over an extended interval.  Precom-
mitment is an attempt to apply the
philosophy of incentive-compatible
regulation to the financial services
industry.  As such, it provides a labo-
ratory for working out implementa-
tion details for this regulatory phi-
losophy, and it may suggest ways of
incorporating this philosophy into
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abrupt withdrawal from trading of any of
these large U.S. [derivatives] dealers
could cause liquidity problems in the
markets and could also pose risks to the
others, including federally insured banks
and the financial system as a whole.”
(Testimony before the Subcomittee on
Telecommunications and Finance, Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, House
of Representatives, May 19, 1994.)
3“Final capital standards for market risk,”
published by the Basel Committee for
Banking Supervision, December 1995.
4See, for example, the request for com-
ments in “Risk-based capital standards:
Market risk; internal models backtest-
ing,” Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 46,
March 7, 1996.
5Paul Kupiec and James O’Brien, “A
precommitment approach to capital
requirements for market risk,” Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, working
paper, June 1995.
6“Fed’s trading set-aside plan draws mix
of catcalls, kudos,” American Banker,
November 8, 1995.
1Data on banks’ trading book assets are
from Alan Berger, Anil Kashyap, and
Joseph Scalise, “The transformation of
the U.S. banking industry,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2, 1995.
2For example, consider the following
statement by Charles A. Bowsher, Comp-
troller General of the United States, on



























































































































































































































Sources: The Midwest Manufacturing Index (MMI)
is a composite index of 15 industries, based on
monthly hours worked and kilowatt hours.  IP rep-
resents the Federal Reserve Board industrial pro-
duction index for the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Autos and light trucks are measured in annualized
units, using seasonal adjustments developed by the
Board.  The purchasing managers’ survey data
for the Midwest are weighted averages of the sea-
sonally adjusted production components from the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchasing Man-
agers’ Association surveys, with assistance from











(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Feb. Month ago Year ago
Cars 6.1 5.7 7.2




Jan. Month ago Year ago
MMI 143.0 143.4 142.9
124.1 124.7 124.0 IP
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
Feb. Month ago Year ago
MW 55.3 58.5 66.2
55.8 44.0 44.3 U.S.
1994
Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
Midwest manufacturing activity was strong in February, but began to show increas-
ing signs of variability.  The composite purchasing managers’ survey was well
above the nation, indicating continued expansion in manufacturing.  Among the
three regional surveys that comprise the Midwest composite, the Detroit and
Milwaukee surveys were expanding in January and February.  In contrast, Chicago
was down sharply, falling into line with the national survey after posting a strong
gain in December. Both the MMI and the IP show a dip in production in January.
Light-vehicle production in January was disrupted by the East Coast blizzard.
Units assembled dropped from 11.6 million (saar) in December to 10.8 million
in January (reflected in the MMI and IP).  A rebound is expected in February
and March (barring further disruptions from the UAW strike in Dayton).